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Can the U.S. System
of Workplace Training
Survive Global Competition?
Peter B. Doeringer 
Boston University
One of the most well-documented facts of modern labor economics 
is that education and training, or what economists call human capital 
investments, have high payoff in terms of income and productivity 
(Denison 1985). In a country like the United States with a large public 
education system and high levels of college attendance, estimates are 
that investments in schooling yield a rate of return in excess of 10 per 
cent and that over half of all national wealth is in the form of the edu 
cation and skills of the labor force (U.S. Congress 1973).
Increases in human capital have traditionally translated into rising 
productivity and growth in earnings (Denison 1985; Jorgenson 1988). 
During the postwar period, the American economy could regularly 
count on productivity increases of around 3 percent a year. After the 
OPEC oil shock of 1973, however, this rate plummeted to nine-tenths 
of a percent.
Many explanations have been offered to explain this decline fall 
ing R&D expenditures, low rates of savings and investment, increased 
governmental regulation, and even the bureaucratic and myopic behav 
ior of managers (Griliches 1988; Jorgenson 1988; Olson 1988). How 
ever, a series of blue-ribbon competitiveness commissions advanced 
the thesis that the accumulating weaknesses of American schools were 
also a significant drag on productivity growth.
The Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Effi 
ciency (1989) reported that "vast numbers of American students cannot 
meet the educational requirements of today's workplace, much less 
those of the next century...." A study by the American Society of 
Training Directors (1989) concluded that the problem of "deficiencies 
in basic workplace skills is a growing one... [which is] driving the
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nation toward a human capital deficit...that threatens the competitive 
ness of economic institutions...." A Business Week (1988) cover story 
on human capital reported that "the U.S. has lost much ground to com 
petitors, and investing in people looks like the way to retake it." The 
general conclusion of this wave of reports was that educational reform 
and new partnerships between education and business were needed to 
restore productivity growth and to make American industry competi 
tive.
The U.S. System of Workplace Training and Productivity
While not wishing to diminish the importance of education reform, I 
would argue that the crux of the nation's human capital deficiencies 
does not lie exclusively in its schools, and that improvements in educa 
tion are not as central to solving the nation's productivity and human 
capital problems as many have argued. Even if schooling could be a 
critical part of the long-term solution to the nation's competitiveness 
problems, it could do little to rebuild the productive capacity of today's 
workers who are already out of school and who will account for two- 
thirds of the next decade's labor force. Instead, the problem is rooted in 
the weakening of America's workplace system for building labor pro 
ductivity where I define productivity to include effort, commitment, 
and problem-solving capacity, as well as job skills.
Schools in this country have never contributed much to this broad 
conception of productivity and are unlikely ever to play a major role, 
given the organization of work in American industry. The K-12 school 
system, and even vocational and technical schools and higher educa 
tion, are largely intended to provide a once-in-a-lifetime foundation of 
basic skills for young workers who are entering the labor market. No 
matter how high the quality, common denominator training in founda 
tion skills for entry-level jobs cannot prepare workers to operate spe 
cific technologies, to accommodate quickly to changing products and 
materials, to meet rising standards of quality, or to solve day-to-day 
production problems. Nor can it prepare workers for the inevitable 
changes in skills that will occur during their working lives.
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Lifetime skills of this sort can only be learned through experience 
gained on-the-job by working on the shop floor or in other work set 
tings. A sense of the importance of such workplace training can be 
obtained by comparing the earnings of recent school graduates who 
have little or no work experience with those of workers whose produc 
tivity has been increased through experiential learning. The earnings of 
full-time, male high school graduates, for example, will about double 
after thirty years of work experience and a similar amount of work 
experience will more than double the earnings of college graduates.
If I have persuaded you that the "workplace training system" is wor 
thy of attention as a source of improved earnings and productivity, then 
it is important to understand how this system works and what has been 
happening to it in recent years. I will use the example of production 
workers in manufacturing as an illustration, but many of the same prin 
ciples apply more generally to other occupations and other sectors.
Recent Trends in the Workplace Training System
The United States actually has two systems of workplace training. 
One is what my radical colleagues call the "Taylorist" or "Fordist" sys 
tem that originated in mass production manufacturing in the early part 
of the twentieth century; the second is a newer "high-commitment" 
system that was initially introduced in nonunion, high-technology 
manufacturing after World War II.
The Fordist System
Under the Fordist system, workers are hired into entry-level jobs 
that require little or no skill. Those who pass a probationary period of 
employment are gradually promoted up the rungs of a job ladder to 
positions of increasing skill, responsibility, and pay. Promotion gener 
ally follows seniority, and each promotion requires additional on-the- 
job training to bring employees up to full productive capacity.
Many of the skills acquired in this way are unique to a particular 
company's technology and work organization, and workers therefore 
acquire human capital that is valuable only in a specific employment
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situation. The cost to the firm of providing such skills gives employers 
an incentive to retain trained workers.
At the same time, the lack of transferable skills and the importance 
of seniority in job ladder promotions mean that if workers quit their 
jobs to work for another employer, they are likely to lose income 
because they will have to start again at the bottom of the job ladder. 
Since changing jobs is costly to both employers and workers, one of 
the benefits of working under the Fordist system is that senior workers 
who have acquired the greatest training and experience tend to accu 
mulate the most job security and are the least likely to quit.
The Fordist system, however, is about more than building workforce 
productivity through on-the-job training and experience. It also 
involves raising productivity through "effort bargains," often reached 
collectively between labor and management. Collective bargaining 
agreements can be seen as "grand" effort bargains that commit workers 
to a certain work pace in exchange for agreed-upon rates of pay and 
other conditions of employment. These "grand bargains" are further 
elaborated through numerous informal "shop floor effort bargains" in 
which workers supply the extra effort and assistance needed to resolve 
unanticipated production problems in exchange for time off or other 
considerations that can be granted by foremen (Kaboolian 1990).
Such collective effort bargains provide a means of ensuring that pro 
ductivity increases do not unduly threaten job security and that gains in 
output are shared between labor and management. At the same time, 
they secure worker consent to providing the regular increases in effi 
ciency that are needed to sustain economic gains and job security over 
the longer term.
The High-Commitment System
The high-commitment system shares many of the underlying 
sources of productivity found in the Fordist model. Workers are hired 
into entry-level jobs and are then promoted to positions of increasing 
skill, responsibility, and pay.
Where these two systems part company, however, is in the nature of 
their effort bargains. The high-commitment systems emphasizes indi 
vidual, rather than collective, effort bargains. In contrast to the Fordist 
model which relies on collective bargaining processes to set and
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enforce the rate of productivity growth, the high-commitment model 
relies on a complex set of psychological and sociological management 
techniques to encourage individual workers to internalize the goals and 
objectives of the company and to act so as to achieve these goals.
Under these individual effort bargains, workers are asked to adopt 
performance goals and are trained to self-monitor and self-discipline 
their performance. As soon as a given performance goal is achieved, 
workers are encouraged to adopt a new effort bargain that incorporates 
higher production targets.
The quid pro quo for these high-commitment effort bargains is the 
pledge by the company to provide intensive career training and devel 
opment within the company, fair levels of compensation, and often an 
implicit guarantee of lifetime employment. The result is continuous 
improvement in both productivity and career earnings.
Comparing the Models
Both the Fordist and high-commitment systems have in common the 
ability to enhance labor productivity through workplace training and 
through the setting of workplace norms that control effort. However, 
these systems gain productivity at the cost of both high wages and a 
certain amount of inflexibility that comes from routine adherence to 
job ladder assignments and from the provision of long-term employ 
ment security.
Fordist firms, for example, tend to pay high wages as part of their 
collective effort bargains, while high-commitment firms typically 
match or exceed Fordist wage rates as a way of underscoring the fair 
ness of the terms of their effort bargains with individual workers. 
These high performance pay premiums are not trivial. In high-perfor 
mance industries such as chemicals and petroleum, nonelectrical 
machinery (including computers), and primary metals, they range from 
16 percent to 29 percent above economy wide averages for comparable 
skills (Katz and Summers 1989).
In economics terms, these productivity-enhancing practices corre 
spond to a concept know as "efficiency wage theory." Efficiency wage 
theory is a metaphor about how employment relationships can suffer 
from what economists call "principal-agent" problems because 
employers (who are the principals) and workers (who are the agents of
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the employer) have somewhat divergent and adversarial interests that 
can lead to low labor productivity unless workers' abilities can be pre 
cisely measured and workers' productivity closely supervised. Main 
stream labor economics has focused on high wage premiums as the 
motivating force for ensuring that productivity will be maintained, but 
it has not fully appreciated that wages are only a part of more complex 
workplace systems that raise productivity through various types of 
effort bargaining.
Employment-At-Will and the Secondary Labor Market
High-performance, efficiency wage systems contrast sharply with a 
third, and very different, workplace system that I refer to as "employ- 
ment-at-will." The employment-at-will system resembles a "spot" 
market for labor, in which wages and employment are determined by 
the invisible hand of competition. In the employment-at-will system, 
jobs are dead end; employers provide little or no training and advance 
ment opportunity; there are no effort bargains or incentive wage premi 
ums above market levels; and employment is impermanent.
Collectively, these jobs belong to the secondary labor market of 
marginal firms and marginal industries such as clothing and textiles. 
During much of the postwar period, economists assumed that these 
low-wage, low-performance industries would gradually be replaced by 
Fordist and high-commitment industries, thereby further aiding growth 
in productivity and earnings.
The Collapse of High-Performance Employment Systems
This assumption has been shattered by sharp declines in the fortunes 
of high-performance manufacturing plants since the mid-1970s. Profits 
fell during the 1970s and early 1980s by about one-third from the lev 
els of the 1960s under the pressures of deregulation and loss of market 
share to international competitors. These pressures rippled through the 
labor market as over three-fourths of all large manufacturing compa 
nies closed or significantly downsized a facility (Berenbeim 1986),
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causing as many as two million workers a year to be displaced from 
their jobs.
Employment losses were most severe in import-sensitive industries 
such as steel and apparel. Employment in basic steel has fallen by 58 
percent since 1973, and other mature industries have experienced sub 
stantial job cuts textile employment has fallen by 32 percent and 
apparel by 29 percent, while the auto industry has lost 16 percent of its 
jobs. As many as one in five of today's unemployed workers have now 
permanently lost their jobs (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3).
While some workers have found replacement jobs quickly, displace 
ment for most means being out of work for an average of nine months 
to a year. Not only are replacement jobs harder to find, but they are also 
likely to be less permanent and to pay less than the career jobs that they 
replace (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3).
Reemployment has meant wage losses of 25 percent or more for a 
quarter to a third of all displaced workers. The biggest losers have been 
high-seniority workers who have held jobs in high-performance firms 
(Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3). These jobs are also less secure because 
newly hired workers have the least seniority and because the mix of 
available jobs is becoming less stable. For example, involuntary part- 
time employment rose by almost three-fourths between 1973 and 1991 
(Mishel and Bernstein 1993, table 4.10), and employment in the tem 
porary help industry exploded during this period (Mishel and Bernstein 
1993, tables 4.21 and 4.22; Christensen 1989). These impermanent 
jobs do not offer the kinds of training opportunities or effort bargains 
that are available to permanent workers in high-performance firms.
The real earnings of those who remain employed in manufacturing 
have experienced a similar shock. Prior to the 1970s, real hourly earn 
ings in manufacturing rose at an annual rate of about 1.5 percent. 
Between 1973 and 1979, however, real hourly earnings in manufactur 
ing rose at about half that rate and actually fell between 1980 and 
1988. Overall, real earnings in manufacturing have fallen by over 9 
percent since 1979.
Young workers have been hardest hit by these changes. Prior to the 
1970s, young males could expect strong gains in real earnings during 
their twenties as they moved from relatively short-term "youth" jobs to 
higher-paying and more stable "career" jobs. The restructuring of man 
ufacturing has changed this pattern, leaving a generation of young
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adults increasingly stranded in low-wage, dead-end, and often part- 
time service jobs. As a result, the real incomes of young male high 
school graduates fell by 24 percent between 1973 and 1986, and by 37 
percent for high school dropouts (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 2).
For those at mid-career, job attachment is becoming less secure as 
the risk of displacement rises, and even older workers are finding that 
their once secure career jobs are ending prematurely. Rather than hold 
ing a career job until retirement, one in three male workers over fifty- 
five are moving from career jobs to lower-paid "bridge" jobs. One- 
fourth of these bridge jobs involve a change of both occupation and 
industry and half result in a drop in earnings of 25 percent or more 
(Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3; Ruhm 1992).
The degree and persistence of job and earnings losses is unprece 
dented since the Great Depression of the 1930s; all workers are now at 
risk of job loss at some point in their careers. While the effects of busi 
ness restructuring have been most acute for minorities and those with 
educational disadvantages, even college graduates have been affected. 
Estimates are that one in five college graduates are now underutilized 
because they are working in jobs that do not require college degrees  
a rate that has almost doubled since 1970 (Hecker 1992).
To some economists, these developments are not a major source of 
concern. They see such adjustments as evidence that labor in the U.S. 
economy had become overpriced, overeducated, and inefficiently uti 
lized by world standards. Trimming employment and cutting real 
wages are the recommended prescriptions for such a situation, and 
these steps should help to restore the economy to its long-term growth 
path.
Such an assessment, however, ignores the way in which the nation's 
workplace training and productivity capacity is also being eroded by 
industrial restructuring. Much of the reduction in employment and 
earnings in manufacturing is, in fact, symptomatic of the reconfigura 
tion that is occurring in workplace training systems, and these changes 
may adversely affect the long-term patterns of productivity and growth 
in the American economy.
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Breaking Effort Bargains
Employment reductions in large enterprises have obviously dimin 
ished the number of workers receiving training and premium pay in 
high-performance workplaces. However, an even more significant con 
sequence of restructuring is that companies are being forced to recon 
sider the collective and individual effort bargains that have been one of 
the lynchpins of productivity improvement in the postwar period.
Cutting Wages
In Fordist workplaces, the grand effort bargains are being changed 
through wage rollbacks and concessions in other wage entitlements 
such as cost-of-living allowances (Bell 1989). Shop floor effort bar 
gains are also being broken as centralized bargaining in industries such 
as steel and autos is being replaced by decentralized and fragmented 
bargaining that allows for additional local wage reductions (Katz 
1992). At the same time, effort bargains are also becoming more uncer 
tain through the introduction of two-tier wage systems, lump-sum and 
bonus payments, and profit-sharing schemes (Bell 1989).
There has been a similar reneging on effort bargains in high-com 
mitment firms. Pay increases and career advancement have become 
much less certain, and the implicit guarantees of lifetime employment 
are being routinely broken by waves of layoffs, sometimes thinly dis 
guised as early retirement programs. Even IBM the leading propo 
nent of high-commitment effort bargains has been forced to abandon 
its long tradition of virtual job guarantees and has begun to rely on lay 
offs to trim its workforce.
Getting More Productivity
Both Fordist and high-commitment firms are also trying to increase 
the productivity side of effort bargains. Quality circles and other forms 
of employee involvement have been adopted to improve productivity, 
solve quality problems, and more generally to motivate employees to 
contribute more to business performance (Cole 1989; Kochan, Katz, 
and McKersie 1986). Concerns with lagging productivity in steel in the 
1970s, for example, led to the establishment of plant-level labor-man-
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agement committees to find ways to increase productivity. More 
recently, shop floor labor-management committees have been used to 
address similar problems in autos.
Inflexible work rules and job assignment practices are often identi 
fied by management as a major source of labor inefficiency (Kochan, 
Katz, and McKersie 1986). Such inflexibility is now being combated 
by consolidating job classifications and by deploying workers more 
widely within the enterprise. Flexibility in work assignments has also 
been used to increase the skill and responsibility of production jobs by 
blurring the dividing line between supervisory and production work.
Decentralization of personnel and labor relations decisions is also 
seen as a move that will increase labor efficiency by making it easier to 
change local effort bargains. For example, in a significant break with 
past practice, individual auto plants and union locals have been 
allowed to negotiate explicit labor cost reductions to forestall subcon 
tracting and have sometimes bid for work that the auto companies had 
intended to subcontract (Katz 1992).
The Threat From Employment-At-Will
As high-performance firms try to rewrite their effort bargains in 
response to global competition, they also face unanticipated, head-to- 
head competition from a new breed of domestic employment-at-will 
firms. Part of this shift to employment-at-will production is occurring 
through increased subcontracting, but much of it is coming from large 
and well-established firms that are switching from high-performance to 
employment-at-will practices.
The new employment-at-will firms do not pay the wage premiums 
of Fordist or high-commitment firms, preferring instead to keep wages 
as low as market competition will allow. Jobs with these firms are of 
indefinite duration and employment is quickly adjusted in response to 
changing demand. Management retains unrestricted prerogatives over 
work rules and the assignment of workers; no expectation of job secu 
rity is offered; and no commitment from employees is expected.
Employment-at-will firms do relatively little human resources 
development and do not depend on effort bargains to motivate labor 
productivity. Instead, they rely on market incentives to motivate train 
ing investments and effort. Ironically, relying on market forces for a
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supply of skills has been made easier by the pool of surplus skilled and 
experienced labor released by downsizings and plant closings in the 
high-performance sector.
High-performance firms fear that their current attempts to develop 
more competitive effort bargains may fail, leaving them saddled with 
high wage and employment costs that are not being offset by produc 
tivity gains. In that event, they too are likely to switch to employment- 
at-will practices.
The Turnaround in Unit Labor Costs
Broad-based measures of productivity and labor costs suggest that 
the competitive position of the American economy has been improving 
during this period of restructuring of the workplace training system. 
For example, productivity increases in manufacturing rebounded after 
1980 as more aggressive productivity-improvement strategies came 
into play, almost doubling the annual increases of 1.8 percent a year 
during the period 1975-1980 when employment cost-cutting strategies 
were first introduced.
Unit labor costs, a summary indicator that includes the effects of 
both cost-cutting and productivity-improvement strategies, show a 
similar pattern. Between 1973 and 1979, unit labor costs climbed at an 
average annual rate of 6.1 percent before subsiding to an average of 1.1 
percent a year during the decade of the 1980s. The decline in unit labor 
costs is especially remarkable in a number of mature industries. In 
nonelectrical machinery, unit labor costs in the 1980s fell at an annual 
rate of 5.2 percent, and there were also declines in women's apparel of 
4.3 percent per year and in autos of two-tenths of a percent a year.
What cannot be determined, however, is the extent to which these 
improvements in cost competitiveness are the result of structural 
changes in high-performance workplaces that have enhanced labor 
productivity. The results could equally reflect cost-cutting reductions 
in effort bargains, the effects of closures of inefficient plants as markets 
declined, and a shift in the composition of production from high-wage, 
high-performance firms to lower-wage, employment-at-will firms.
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Can Public Policy Help?
While most of the changes affecting labor productivity have been 
the result of private actions taken by companies and unions, their con 
sequences are a matter of deep public concern. For example, a recent 
study by the Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce 
(1990), a group that is reported to reflect the Clinton administration's 
thinking on workforce issues, concluded that raising productivity and 
restoring American living standards will depend on expanding high- 
performance employment. Three policy recommendations were identi 
fied as central to accomplishing this goal: (1) establishing a common 
threshold level of foundation skills for entry jobs; (2) creating a public 
system of skill training that would combine schooling with work expe 
rience; and (3) supporting increased workplace training and work reor 
ganization through a 1 percent "play or pay" payroll tax.
In my view, however, such policies will not be sufficient to shift the 
balance in favor of high-performance firms. Raising foundation skills 
is a much overrated solution to the kinds of productivity problems fac 
ing high-performance firms. The foundations of productivity that are 
valued by such firms are not those of knowledge and skills, but involve 
workforce qualities such as flexibility, adaptability, teamwork, and 
problem-solving capacity. These are not the qualities that schools are 
used to training for, nor do they lend themselves to the setting of 
national standards for achievement.
Expanding public skill-training programs is also unlikely to foster 
an increase in the high-performance sector. Fordist and high-commit 
ment firms have little difficulty recruiting the basic skills they need, 
and they often prefer to provide their own job training as part of effort 
bargains with their employees.
Where skill-training programs can make a difference, however, is in 
supplying trained labor to the employment-at-will sector. Employ- 
ment-at-will firms want to hire workers who are job-ready, and they 
deliberately place the burden of human capital formation on workers 
and schools. As the employment-at-will sector expands, these training 
needs will grow.
Unfortunately, we lack the kinds of public sector skill-building insti 
tutions that can substitute for the lack of workplace training in the
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employment-at-will sector. With the exception of long-term residential 
programs such as the Jobs Corps, most government skill-training pro 
grams have yielded relatively little upgrading of skills, and the 
improvement in earnings has been correspondingly low (Taggart 1981; 
Bloom 1984; JTPA Advisory Committee 1989). Even the relatively 
well-financed programs for displaced workers have only been mini 
mally effective (Podgursky and Swaim 1989; Seitchik and Zornitsky 
1989).
A much talked-about new approach to skill training is the German 
model of apprenticeship training. The German "dual system," as it is 
called, blends technical and vocational schooling with on-the-job expe 
rience at a designated workplace. This system has been an effective 
source of skill training for young high school graduates in Germany, 
and there is a similar program for upgrading adult skills (Osterman 
1991).
This German model, however, is unlikely to succeed in the United 
States, even if coupled with strong partnerships between schools and 
employers. An effective apprenticeship training program for the 
employment-at-will sector needs to be able to link training to the high 
est common denominator needs of specific groups of employers so that 
workers can easily transfer from one firm to another as employment 
shifts.
In contrast, school-based apprenticeships and other types of work 
and education partnerships in the United States have more typically 
gravitated towards the lowest common denominator training for entry 
jobs. Programs that have had more ambitious goals have usually been 
tailored to serve the needs of a single large employer. Rarely have 
these programs had any mechanism for ensuring high-productivity 
training for a pool of potential employers, and none have sought to 
facilitate labor mobility among such employers.
A more suitable model is apprenticeship programs that are jointly 
operated by unions and employer associations, such as those for craft 
workers in the building trades. Because craft unions represent the 
human capital interests of their members and have hiring commitments 
from a pool of employers, they can operate apprenticeship programs 
that meet the highest common denominator skill needs in their indus 
try. Furthermore, because such programs involve groups of employers, 
they are well-suited to operate in the unstable and shifting markets of
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the employment-at-will sector. In principle, these programs could also 
meet the neglected training needs of small employers, who account for 
about one in five jobs in manufacturing.
The carrot and stick of a modest payroll tax, however, is unlikely to 
make much difference to the future of this type of apprenticeship pro 
grams. The track record of similar subsidies for workplace training 
suggests that such incentives are insufficient to leverage substantial 
changes in employment practices, let alone overcome employer resis 
tance in the employment-at-will sector to participation in training pro 
grams that involve unions (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 1).
A more effective policy direction might be to encourage union orga 
nization in the employment-at-will sector. Training funds could then be 
used to subsidize both workplace training and school-based classroom 
training conducted under union-management apprenticeship programs. 
If desired, threshold competency standards for these programs could be 
set by the employers and workers who will be using the training. While 
such a proposal runs counter to much of the thrust of government pol 
icy towards unions over the past decade or so, it may be timely to 
rethink this entire policy area.
The idea that productivity growth can be achieved through partner 
ships among business, government, and labor is relevant to the high- 
performance sector as well, particularly in Fordist firms that rely on 
negotiations with unions to define productivity levels. Governments 
can contribute in important ways to the climate in which effort bar 
gains are negotiated by encouraging the substitution of high-perfor 
mance labor relations in place of adversarial collective bargaining.
An example of this approach is found in the experience of 
Jamestown, New York, where frequent strikes and outmoded union 
work rules were accelerating the decline of the city's industrial base. 
Through the mediation efforts of the city government, areawide labor- 
management committees were established to improve the labor-rela 
tions climate. These efforts in turn led to the creation of in-plant labor- 
management committees, which are reported to have successfully 
slowed the loss of manufacturing jobs during the 1970s by reducing 
strikes, improving productivity, and changing the image of the city as a 
"bad labor town" (Gittell 1992).
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Future Directions for Workplace Training and Productivity
The American workplace is at a critical juncture in terms of its con 
tribution to labor productivity. Cost-cutting, restructuring, and produc 
tivity improvements are restoring competitiveness in production to 
many industries, but it is not clear what types of jobs and workplace 
training systems will survive.
Companies and unions across the country are now debating which 
workplace training system should guide productivity and wage deter 
mination into the next century. Will it be some version of the Fordist 
model that is evolving in autos and steel; will it be a high-commitment 
model with high wages, intensive human resources development, and 
some form of employment guarantee; will it involve a greater use of 
craft and apprenticeship training arrangements; or will it be the low- 
wage, low-productivity employment-at-will model?
Each of these systems implies a different type of commitment to 
human resources development and a different approach to generating 
productivity growth. Each places a distinct imprint on the adjustment 
process in terms of who is affected, how the costs of adjustment are 
divided between employers and workers, and the rate at which plant- 
level productivity will grow. Ultimately, these are choices between 
high- and low-productivity strategies at the workplace, which, in the 
aggregate, will translate into long-term choices between a high-growth 
path and a low-growth path for productivity and income in the national 
economy.
At present, high-performance models of all kinds are imperiled by 
continued downsizing, broken effort bargains, and competition from 
employment-at-will production. Despite widespread management and 
union interest in improving labor productivity and successful instances 
where workplace restructuring has raised labor efficiency (Katz, 
Kochan, and Gobeille 1983; Katz 1985; Cooke 1989), a recent survey 
of medium- and large-size companies found that only two in five were 
using high-performance workplace practices, and in only a quarter of 
these firms did high-performance practices apply to more than half of 
the workforce (Osterman 1993).
It therefore remains to be seen whether the high-performance work 
place can survive long enough to gain a majority share in the U.S. 
labor market, or if the low-performance, employment-at-will model 
will prevail.
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